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The EU Administration of Mostar: Implications for the 








This article explores the EU’s efforts to reunify and reconstruct Mostar through the seminal 
experiment of EUAM (1994-1996), which combined peacebuilding with urban reconstruction in an 
innovative way. The aim is to identify lessons to be learned from the experiences of EUAM that can 
assist the EU to adjust its peacebuilding approach to better address post-conflict divides in cities 
where the EU currently is engaged. Cities divided by violent conflict tend to freeze the conflict, as 
they remained divided regardless of a conflict settlement, and they become serious obstacles to peace 
and a challenge to peacebuilding. Far too little is known about the role of urban space in building 
peace in ethno-nationally contested cities. By marrying critical urban studies with critical 
peacebuilding literature this article brings novelty to EU-studies and advances our understanding of 
the EU’s role in peacebuilding as well as in the Western Balkans. 
 





The EU is emerging as a major player in regional and global peacebuilding. However, 
its evolving peacebuilding approach and praxis contain contradictions and 
complexities as well as aspirations and potential. The Western Balkans well 
illustrates this, as it has long been the testing ground for the EU’s new approaches to 
peace and security. It is for example in the Western Balkans that the EU developed its 
regional approach to peacebuilding and it is also  where the EU undertook the 
seminal experiment to administrate a city – the contested city of Mostar in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This article explores the EU’s reconstruction, reintegration and 
reunification efforts in the divided city of Mostar and their implication for the EU’s 
evolving peacebuilding approach.  
 
The Bosnian city of Mostar emerged from the Bosnian war as a divided city with 
unresolved ethno-nationalistic conflicts. It became a platform for expressing 
conflicting sovereignty claims. The ethno-national conflict was spatialized and turned 
into material and symbolic spatial relations as Croatian and Bosniac communities 
split the city into two autonomous halves along the Austro-Hungarian Boulevard in 
1993.1 Although the symbolic Stari Most (the Old Bridge) has been rebuilt, the two 
                                                        
1 S. Bollens, Urban Peacebuilding in divided societies, Belfast and Johannesburg, Boulder, Westview Press, 
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communities remain deeply divided and the city is still contested more than 15 years 
after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord that brought an end to the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
 
This divide in Mostar is a spatial, social and political construct that is closely linked 
with identities. Such division in a city is rarely a mutually accepted status quo and  
control of the city space continues to be contested. Cities divided by violent conflict 
tend to freeze the conflict, as they remained divided regardless of an official conflict 
settlement. They become symbols of the continuities rather than discontinuities 
between war and peace.2 From a peacebuilding perspective, the divided city is both 
an obstacle to peace and an indication of failed peacebuilding.3 The contested and 
ethno-nationally divided city of Mostar is a case in point.  
 
By marrying critical urban studies with critical peacebuilding literature, this article 
brings novelty to EU-studies and advances our understanding of the EU’s evolving 
peacebuilding approach and praxis.4 Intrigued by the unique experience of EUAM, 
this article asks what lessons the EU can draw from the efforts to reintegrate and 
reunify the Bosnian city of Mostar that are of relevance to other cities partitioned by 
violent conflict, and investigates the potential implications of EUAM for the EU’s 
evolving peacebuilding approach. Surprisingly, little scholarly attention has been 
paid to the extraordinary measure adopted by the EU to administrate, rebuild and 
reintegrate Mostar.5 In addition, the evolving EU peacebuilding framework as yet 
seems not to have included any lessons learned from this experiment of 
administrating a post-conflict divided city. Although EUAM has been evaluated by 
the EC Court of Auditors and the European Parliament, the innovation of 
peacebuilding rescaled to the city level has not been properly assessed, and the 
original ideas and practice derived from EUAM have not been mainstreamed into the 
EU’s evolving peacebuilding framework.6 The EU’s long-term engagement in the 
partitioned city of Belfast through the EU Peace Fund I and II, for example, fail to 
demonstrate that the EU peacebuilding approach has incorporated lessons from 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1999. 
2 S. Bollens, Cities, nationalism and democratization. London, Routledge, 2007; H. Al-Harithy, Lessons in  
Post-War Reconstruction. Case study from Lebanon in the Aftermath of the 2006 War, London & New York,  
Routledge, 2010; J. Calame & E.R. Charlesworth, Divided cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and  
Nicosia, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009. 
3 It refers to dynamic processes that aim to balance the twin aims of consolidating peace and averting relapse  
into conflict by identifying, alleviating and eliminating underlying causes of conflict (B. Boutros-Ghali, An  
Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. UN Dept. of Public Information,  
Yearbook of the United Nations, 1992; J. Lederach, Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided 
Societies. Washington, United States Institute of Peace, 1997; J. Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art  
And Soul of Building Peace, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). 
4 D. Davies and N. Libertun de Duran (eds.), Cities & sovereignty: identity politics in urban spaces,  
Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 2011; J. Davies and D. L. Imbroscio (eds.), Critical urban studies:  
new directions, Albany, N.Y., State University of New York Press, 2009; E. Newman et al., New Perspectives  
on Liberal Peacebuilding, Tokyo, UN University Press, 2009; O. Richmond, Critical Advances in  
Peacebuilding, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; O. Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace: The Infrapolitics  
of  Peacebuilding, New York, London, Routledge, 2011. 
5 For exceptions see F. Bieber, ‘Local institutional engineering: A tale of two cities, Mostar and Brcko,’ 
International  Peacekeeping, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2005, pp. 420-433; L. Vetters, ‘The Power of Administrative 
Categories:  Emerging Notions of Citizenship in the Divided City of Mostar,’ Ethnopolitics, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2007,  
pp. 187-209; C. Stahn, The Law and Practice of Internaitonal Territorial Administration, Cambridge,  
Cambridge University Press, 2008. pp. 301-308. 
6 Special Report No. 2/96 concerning the accounts of the Administrator and the European Union Administration, 
Mostar (EUAM) accompanied by the replies of the Commission and the Administrator of Mostar, European 
Parliament Report on Special Report No 2/96 para. 18.  
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EUAM and is able to take into account the urban dynamics.7 Neither does the EU’s 
approach to peacebuilding in Cyprus employ innovative ideas to overcome the 
ethnicized divisions of urban space in Nicosia, suggesting that the EU has been able 
to adjust its peacebuilding approach to the urban level.8 Hence, this article focuses on 
this novel combination of peacebuilding and urban planning comprised in EUAM’s 
ambitions for Mostar.  By doing so, this article aims to demonstrate that lessons can 
be learned from EUAM that can assist the EU to adjust its peacebuilding approach to 
better address divides in post-conflict cities such as Nicosia and Belfast where the EU 
is currently engaged. 
 
The article unfolds in four parts. First, the evolving EU peacebuilding approach is 
discussed. Second, the divisions in the city of Mostar are mapped out and 
investigated. Third, the efforts by EUAM are assessed in the context of the EU’s 
evolving peacebuilding approach. Based on the evaluation of EUAM, the article 
concludes with a critical discussion of the complexities, contradictions and potentials 
of EU peacebuilding, arguing that EU can move beyond the state-centrism that 
plagues its peacebuilding approach by learning from the experience of EUAM and 
rescaling its peacebuilding efforts to the urban level. Rescaling peacebuilding to focus 
on the city is assisted by the EU principle of subsidiarity, and it may contribute to 
facilitate the EU buzzwords of ‘local ownership of peace processes,’ ‘participatory 
peacebuilding,’ ‘stakeholder engagement,’ etc. into its peacebuilding praxis. 
 
Contradictions and aspirations in the EU peacebuilding 
approach 
 
The EU’s emerging peacebuilding approach is driven by the EU’s different practices 
and accumulated experiences on ground. It is not yet a coherent approach as it 
contains contradictions, developments, and learning by doing.  
 
The underlying philosphy of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding 
 
The EU in itself is conceived as a peace project, and its post-war experience of 
integration based on integrationalist and functionalist thinking about peace is the 
foundation for its emerging peacebuilding approach. Consequently, what the EU is 
rather than what the EU does seems important to its achievements as a peacebuilder. 
The strong self-image of the EU is articulated in the “discourse of universal ethics 
which defines the EU as a ‘power for good’ and a ‘peacebuilder’” on the international 
scene.9 A number of core values that guide the internal relations among its member 
                                                        
7 See assessments of the EU Peace Fund I & II for Northern Ireland which supports grass root initiatives to 
address the legacy of the Troubles but fails to demonstrate the adaption of peacebuilding to the urban dynamics in 
Byrne et al. ‘Building Trust and Goodwill in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties: The impact of Economic 
Aid on the Peace Process,’ Irish Political Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2009, pp. 337-363, Byrne et al., ‘Economic 
Assistance, Development and Peacebuilding: The Role of the IFI and EU Peace II Fund in Northern Ireland,’ Civil 
Wars, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, pp. 106-124, C. Lynch, ‘Evaluating the Peace-Building Impact of Structural Funds 
Programmes: The EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland,’ Evaluation, Vol. 13, No. 1, 
2007, pp. 8-31.  
8 O. Richmond, ‘Shared Sovereignty and the Politics of Peace: Evaluating the EU’s catalytic framework in the 
Mediterranean,’ International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2001, pp. 149-176. The Bi-Communal initiative, The Nicosia 
Master Plan, to change the image of the city has gained the attention and financial support of the EU. F. Gaffikin, 
M. Mceldowney & K. Sterrett, ‘Creating Shared Public Space in the Contested City: The Role of Urban Design,’ 
Journal of Urban Design, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2010, pp.493-513. 
9 L. Aggestam, ‘Introduction: Ethical power Europe?’, International Affairs, Vol.  84, No. 1, 2008, pp. 1–11; A.  
Björkdahl, ‘Building Peace- Normative and Military Power in EU Peace operations’, in R. Whitman (ed.),  
Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2011. 
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state have emerged within the EU, such as sustainable peace, consensual democracy, 
human rights, the rule of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable 
development and good governance.10  
 
These core values are also guiding the development of its peacebuilding approach and 
praxis. Its overall goals for peacebuilding are to prevent violent conflict and build 
sustainable peace through development aid, the promotion of democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights, and through strengthening civil society and facilitating the 
construction of the liberal state, or where applicable, Member State.11 In practice, EU 
peacebuilding has been made up of disparate activities by disparate bodies. For 
example, ESDP missions have been responsible for security, policing and the 
promotion of the rule of law; the Commission has engaged in democratization, 
welfare and human rights promotion. The diplomatic role of the high representative 
and various EU special representatives have been framed in the context of the CFSP, 
apart from the broad role of EU institutions in creating transitional administrations, 
and the role played by the EU as a donor. With the Lisbon treaty and the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), new challenges and opportunities are provided for 
the EU in the field of peacebuilding. 
 
The EU’s main theatres of engagement have been where conflict issues are pressing, 
and where other international peacebuilding actors, such as the UN, have called for 
assistance and in areas where members have interests, most significantly in the EU 
region and connected regions.12 The potential of the EU’s transformative influence is 
evident in the Western Balkans, where the dynamics of peacebuilding are connected 
to the enlargement process emphasised by the attraction of membership.13  
 
The Western Balkans – a testing ground for EU peacebuilding practices 
 
The evolution of the EU peacebuilding approach and practice reveals both 
innovations and challenges.14 The Western Balkans have been the testing ground for 
the development of the EU’s approach to peace and security and the EU’s experience 
in this domain has contributed to the development of the EU peacebuilding 
framework.15  
 
The wars in former Yugoslavia were, in the eyes of many Europeans, a symbol of 
collective failure. Yet, it was against the backdrop of the Balkan conflicts in the 1990’s 
that the EU began to frame its role in peace and security. New strategies, tools and 
                                                        
10 I. Manners, ‘The normative ethics of the European Union,’ International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, 2008, pp. 45–
60. 
11 I do not argue that the EU peacebuilding approach as yet represents a coherent approach that is systematically 
translated into practice. However, I offer a critical analysis of how it is gradually emerging through various 
practices. 
12 J. Zielonka, (ed.) Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998. 
13 A. Björkdahl, ‘Europeisering eller Balkanisering? EU som statsbyggare på västra Balkan,’ in Magnus  
Jerneck ed. Fred i Realpolitikens skugga, Lund, Studentlitteratur, 2009; M. Abramovitz,  et al., ‘The Western  
Balkans and the EU: The Hour of Europe,’ Challiot papers, June, 2011; G. Knaus & F. Martin, ‘Travails of the  
European Raj,’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2003, pp. 60-74; H. Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative 
Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006. 
14 O. Richmond et al., ‘The Emerging EU Peacebuilding Framework: Confirming or Transcending Liberal 
Peacebuilding,’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.24, No. 3, 2011, pp. 449-469.  
15 R. Belloni, ‘The Western Balkans and European Integration: Lessons, Prospects, and Obstacles,’ Journal of  
Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2009, pp. 313-331.  A. Björkdahl, ‘Building Peace- Normative 
and Military Power in EU Peace operations,’ op. cit.; M. Abramovitz, et al., op. cit. 
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capacities were been tried out and fine-tuned in the Western Balkans. In 2003, the 
EU tested its conflict prevention idea and launched the CONCORDIA conflict 
prevention mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The EU played, 
and still plays, a major role in the post-conflict situation in Bosnia. It deployed its 
first police operation (EUPM) 2003, and its first military operation EUFOR Althea in 
Bosnia. The growth of different schemes has been a defining feature of the Balkan 
political landscape since the Dayton Peace Accords. The EU also developed a more 
comprehensive regional approach after this conflict, initiated by the EU Council 
Conclusions of 26-27 February 1996.16
 
This regional approach subsequently took 
shape through the ‘Process of stability and good-neighbourly relations in South-
Eastern Europe.’ From the initial steps of the Royamount Process, the Stabilisation 
and Association Process (SAP) of the late 1990s was to support regional cooperation 
and to start harmonize the societies and the laws in the Western Balkans with the 
EU’s acquis communitare.17 The Western Balkans have also seen EU engagement 
through the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilisation (CARDS) launched in 2001, and as the integrationist logic holds, the 
countries in the Western Balkans have successively signed the Instrument of Pre-
Accession Assistance. The EU funding schemes are based on the assumption that the 
Western Balkans will become “European” in terms of gradually adopting EU values 
and standards and that the states will eventually be the image of EU Member-
States.18 
 
The potentials and paradoxes of EU peacebuilding 
 
The regional approach that was developed in the Western Balkans married elements 
of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the enlargement processes 
and this regional approach has emerged as a cornerstone of EU peacebuilding in the 
Western Balkans. This approach is linked to the European Union’s own experience of 
regional integration and a firm belief in regional integration and interdependencies 
as a key to durable peace.19  In the words of the European Parliament, “regional 
cooperation is one of the consistent elements of European integration itself [and] 
serves to bring about peaceful cooperation, economic development and 
democratisation and has therefore repeatedly been advanced and promoted by the 
EU as a successful example and development model for other regions of the world.”20 
With this approach, the EU established a coordinated set of political and economic 
conditionalities aimed at infrastructure, reconstruction and institution-building.21 In 
the Western Balkans, conditionality mainly led to fake compliance, partial 
compliance or non-compliance provoking imposed compliance.22 In response to the 
experience of Balkan post-conflict politics and the general complexities of post-
                                                        
16 D. Becheve, ‘Carrots, sticks and norms: the EU and regional cooperation in Southeast Europe,’ Journal of 
Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2006, pp. 27-43. 
17 K. Coles, ‘Ambivalent Builders: Europeanization the production of Difference and International in Bosnia-
Herzegovina,’ in X. Bougarel, et al. (eds.), The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in 
Post-War Society, Burlington, Ashgate, 2007. 
18 D. Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton, 2nd ed. London, Pluto Press, 2000; A. Juncos, ‘The  
EU’s post-Conflict Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (re)Inventing the  
EU?,’ Southeast European Politics, Vol. VI, No. 2, 2005, pp. 88-108. 
19 N. Nicolaidis and R. Howse, ‘This is my EUtopia”: narrative as power,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 
40(4), 2002, pp. 767–792. 
20 European Council 1997. 
21 T. Freyburg & S. Richter, ‘National identity matters: the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the 
Western Balkans,’ Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2010, pp. 263-281. 
22 G. Noutcheva, ‘Fake, partial and imposed compliance: the limits of the EU’s normative power in the Western 
Balkans,’ Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 16, No. 7, 2009, pp. 1065-1084. 
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conflict societies, the EU promoted civil society from the grassroots to 
counterbalance elite power, enhance accountability of the elite by the society, and to 
circumvent political stagnation.23 Hence promoting civil society has emerged as the 
second cornerstone of its peacebuilding approach. Yet, it rests on a liberal notion of 
civil society as “relatively free from ethno-nationalism and generally oriented towards 
the norms and values of the peacebuilding and statebuilding project.”24 This was 
obviously not the case in the Western Balkans, in particular in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
It is a paradox that the EU – itself a post-modern polity, transcending territorial 
sovereignty and challenging traditional notions of national sovereignty – develops an 
approach to peacebuilding that remains to a large extent state-centric. For example, 
when engaging with the post-conflict societies, the EU does so through the state, and 
it prefers governments or powerful elites as interlocutors on the state level.25 This 
state centrism obviously challenges, and to some extent contradicts, the two other 
cornerstones of the EU peacebuilding framework – the regionalist approach and the 
civil society approach. Hence, there are some obvious contradictions inherent in the 
EU peacbuilding approach and expressed in its praxis.  
 
Despite its obvious contradictions, the evolving peacebuilding approach of the EU 
may provide novel opportunities if lessons could be learnt from EUAM’s 
experimental ‘Mostar model’ of urban reconstruction. EUAM was indeed “an 
experiment of international governance at the urban level, operating under the 
internationalized structure of the Dayton Agreement.”26 It was also a unique effort to 
combine post-conflict peacebuilding with urban planning to reconstruct a city 
divided by violent conflict. Far too little is known about the role of urban space in 
building peace in ethno-nationally contested cities. It is evident that the political 
meanings of urban space and diversities of power relations, as embodied in urban 
space, have implications for how to build a sustainable peace. The prospects for 
urban peacebuilding in terms of space- and place-making have implications for the 
evolving EU peacebuilding approach.  
 
The Contested City of Mostar 
 
Situated on both shores of the Neretva River, Mostar27 was widely held to be one of 
the most multi-ethnic cities in the former Yugoslavia.  It was characterized by mixed 
residential areas, apart from the Old Town Mostar where mainly Bosniacs resided, 
and about one-third of marriages were ethnically mixed.28 As a consequence of war 
and peacebuilding attempts, Mostar emerged as a partitioned city resistant to efforts 




Creating facts on the ground 
                                                        
23 R. Belloni, ‘Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina,’ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 2, 
2001, pp. 163-180. 
24 S. Kappler & O. Richmond, ‘Peacebuilding and culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Resistance or 
Emancipation?,’ Security Dialogue, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2011, pp. 261-278.  
25 S. Kappler & O. Richmond, op. cit. pp. 265-268. 
26 C. Stahn op. cit. p. 301. 
27 Mostar is less populated than Sarajevo and the city’s pre-war population was about 126.000 according to the 
1991 census (S.A. Bollens, Cities, nationalism and democratization, op. cit.). 




During the break up of Yugoslavia,29 Mostar was the battlefront in the “war within 
the war” between Bosnian-Croats and Bosniacs, effectively dividing the city in a 
western Bosnian-Croat part and an eastern Bosniac part.30 Mostar became the site of 
some of the most serious violence and destruction in the region, to the extent that the 
devastation of Mostar has been characterised as an Urbicid.31 Historic monuments, 
cultural property and religious buildings were deliberately targeted during the war to 
destroy the memory of the mixed city. Bridges, for example, had a particular cultural 
meaning in Mostar – apart from their obvious economic and military significance. 
Nine were dynamited by the JNA in the spring of 1992.32 The famous old bridge ‘Stari 
Most’ survived the first war, but was brought down by Croat tanks shelling it in the 
second war (November 1993). At that point no bridge remained.33 
 
After initially jointly defending the city against the Bosnian-Serb forces, alliances 
shifted and fighting broke out between HVO (Croatian Defense Council) and the 
Army of BiH in the spring of 1993. It was a close-fought war street by street, building 
by building, leading to a complete division of the urban community.34 Two separate 
war-time administrations were set up to manage the urban space under their control, 
and crossing to the other side of the city was formally restrained and only a limited 
number of people were allowed to pass.35 
 
The demographic balance of Mostar shifted drastically in course of the war. The total 
city population dropped sharply despite a large influx of displaced persons from 
surrounding areas into both sides of the city, altering the composition of the city’s 
population.36 In the direct aftermath of the war, the communal division was severe 
and few dared to cross the border, which ran throughout the city. The end of the war 
did not mean an end to the ethnic cleansing, which continued in a quieter version 
years after the Dayton Accords brought peace to BiH and members of other ethnic 
groups either left voluntarily or were forcibly expelled.37 Resettling of refugees and 
internally displaced persons as frontier populations was another attempt to use urban 
space to foster confrontation.38 
 
The territorial division of the city continued and was cemented in the post-war era. 
                                                        
29 F. Wilmer, The Social Construction of Man, the State and War. Identity, Conflict and Violence in the Former 
Yugoslavia, New York & London, Routledge, 2002; D. Zarkov, The Body of War. media, ethnicity, and gender in 
the break-up of Yugoslavia, Duke University Press, 2007; B. Blitz (ed.), War and Change in the Balkans, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006; R. Lukic & A. Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals. The 
Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union,Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996; S. Woodward, Balkan 
Tragedy, Washington DC, The Brookings Institute, 1995. 
30 S. Woodward,  op. cit., pp. 18, 279. 
31 Kresimir cited in J. Yarwood, Rebuilding Mostar: Reconstruction in a War Zone. TRP (Town Planning  
Review) Special Studies, No. 3. Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1999. 
32 C. Grodach, ‘Reconstituting identity and history in post-war Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina,’ City, Vol. 6, No. 2,  
2002, pp. 61-82. 
33 Yarwood, op. cit., p. 7. 
34 F. Bieber,  op. cit.; S.A. Bollens, Cities, nationalism and democratization, op. cit., p. 185-188. 
35 F. Bieber, op. cit., Vetters op. cit. 
36 The number of Serbs decreased to less than five percent and the Serb community is today marginal in Mostar. 
In the absence of a power-war census, it is estimated that Croats make up the largest group of about 50-60 
percent of Mostars approximately 100.000 residents, outnumbering Bosniaks composing about 40 per cent, but 
who before the war had been more numerous (International Crisis Group, ‘Bosnia: A Test of Political Maturity in 
Mostar,’ Europe Briefing, No. 54, 27 July, Sarajevo, Brussels, 2009. 
37 Bieber, op. cit.  
38 W. Pullan, ‘Frontier Urbanism: the periphery at the centre of contested cities,’ The Journal of Architecture, Vol. 
18, No. 1, 2011, pp. 15-35. 
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The public, collective sphere that had existed prior to the war became fragmented, 
subordinated and manipulated and the collective interests of the city collapsed and 
dissolved. The divide in the city was the result of a politics of confrontation and 
negotiation in the war and the post-war period. This “ethnization” of urban space 
production constructed an ethno-nationally fractured cityspace.39 
 
The spatial expression of ethno-national politics 
 
Mostar had geopolitical, symbolic value as well as geostrategic importance. As Mostar 
emerged from the ethno-national conflict, the production of urban space was 
inevitably linked to the power relations at the end of the war, territoriality and the 
ambitions to control land, expressions of identity, and to distribution of economic 
benefits and costs. 
 
Mostar’s contested nature made it a target of the post-war nationalist leaderships 
keen to consolidate their grip of the city symbolically and demographically. As a 
consequence, it became a platform for political projects through which different, and 
often clashing, visions of the city and of peace were imagined and expressed.40 The 
real conflict over Mostar was about the city’s role in the broader Croat community, 
the Croats’ position in BiH and, more generally, how majority rule and minority 
rights should co-exist. Mostar was viewed as the capital of the Bosnian-Croat 
secessionist project and it was the political base of the Bosnian Croats’ leadership. 
Through Mostar the Bosnian-Croats tried to compensate for the fact that the Dayton 
Peace Accords did not provide them with a home territorial unite. Despite a formal 
power-sharing system to govern Mostar, similar to the one at the national level, an 
illegal parallel structure of Croat-controlled Herzeg Bosna – a para-state was set up.41  
 
It is within the city that ethnic identities are formed through urban memories and 
everyday experiences, and in Mostar this was an on-going struggle in the post-war 
period.42 The contestations involved in the reconstruction of the symbolic urban 
space were linked to processes of identity formation, cultural reinterpretations, and 
political reconfigurations. Mostar was the site for the Bosnian-Croats ambitions to 
preserve their national culture, and the city became notorious for the gigantic cross 
on Mount Hum above the city. The Old bridge of Mostar (Stari Most) also has 
importance in reconstituting the Mostar identity in the post-war years, but not as 
often envisioned by international donors as a symbol to connect the two communities 
on each side of the river. In fact Stari Most connected the Bosniac community on the 
eastern riverbank with its foothold on the western bank. This 16th century Ottoman 
bridge became a symbol in the process of reinterpreting Bosnia’s legacy of Ottoman 
city space.43 Focusing on the politics of space and place – the struggles and political 
relations concerning the material and symbolic aspects of particular communities – 
helped to crystallize the notion of belonging and how it was formed in practice.44  
                                                        
39 Cityspace refers to the constantly eolvolving, intentionally planned, and politically charged spatialization of 
social life. 
40 International Crisis Group, Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress. ICG Report no. 90, 19 April, 2000. 
41 International Crisis Group, ‘Reunifying Mostar, Opportunities for progress,’ Balkan Report, No. 90, Sarajevo, 
Washington, Brussels, 2000; R. Belloni & S. Deane ’From Belfast to Bosnia: Piecemeal Peacemaking and the Role 
of Institutional Learning,’ Civil Wars, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2005, pp. 219-243. 
42 R. Kallus & Z. Kolodney, ‘Politics of Urban Space in an Ethno-Nationally Contested City: Negotiating 
(Co)Existence in Wadi Nisnas,’ Journal of Urban Design, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2010, pp. 403- 424, p. 406. 
43 Grodach, op.cit. 




The urban space of Mostar comprised territorial and non-territorial divisions, layers 
of conflicted meanings, as well as urban forms and the spatial practices, and endemic 
to them were important aspects of power but also resistance towards power.45 Post-
war urban governance and urbanism became means by which Mostar’s war profiteers 
solidify their hold on power and reinforce ethno-nationalist divisions. It is strongly 
evident that the formation of boundaries was linked to ethno-national identity and 
power relations. The right to the city became a key issue and the divisions reflected 
the winner-loser relations in governance structures as well as in realities on the 
ground.46 
 
EUAM and the reconstruction of Mostar 
 
Despite the often-cited ‘fiasco’ of the EU’s involvement during the violent dissolution 
of Yugoslavia, the EU’s various interventions in the region served to foster the EU’s 
approach to peacebuilding. The EU’s administration of Mostar was an extraordinary 
example of direct international management of a city and a highly unusual strategy of 
urban reconstruction.47 Through the Washington Agreement of March 1994, Mostar 
became an “area under EU administration,” but remained officially part of the 
Federation of BiH.48 The EUAM’s efforts to reintegrate and reunify Mostar were 




Peace-making included attempts at negotiations, mediations, and to accommodate 
and balance the competing interests of the different communities residing within 
Mostar. More than thirty major agreements49 between the two sides were negotiated 
where representatives of the international community repeatedly brokered deals on 
the same issues: return of refugees and displaced persons, unification of police, 
unification of city and canton budgets, unification of city and canton institutions. 
Eventually the negotiations resulted in the Washington Agreement signed in 1994, 
which established a Federation of Bosniacs and Bosnian-Croats. As part of this 
agreement, Mostar was recognised as a joint Bosniac-Croat city and the capital of the 
mixed Croat-Bosniac Herzegovina-Neretva canton. Following the Washington 
Agreement, top officials from the two sides met in Geneva to decide the future of 
Mostar. As the Croat side was opposed to an UN administration in Mostar a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed in Geneva on 5 of July 1994 
between the Bosnian-Croats and the Bosniacs (exluding the Bosnian-Serbs) and this 
political compromise placed Mostar under EU administration (EUAM) for an interim 
period between July 1994-July 1996. This was later included as an annex to the 
                                                        
45 c.f. D. Hayden, The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1995; K.  
Dovey,‘Memory, democracy and urban space: Bankok’s path to democracy,’ Journal of Urban Design, Vol. 6,  
No. 3, 2001, pp. 265-282. 
46 Kallus & Kolodney, op. cit., p. 406. 
47 Yarwood, op. cit. 
48 The EU Administration of Mostar was established by Council Decisions 94/308/CFSP, OJEC [1994] L 134/1 
and 94/790/CFSP OJ 1994 L 326/2, repeatedly extended and terminated by Decisions 96/442/CFSP, OJEC 
[1996] L 185/1, 96/476/CFSP, OJEC [1996] L 195/1, 96/508/CFSP, OJEC [1996] L 212/1 and 96/744/CFSP, 
OJEC [1996] L 340/1.   
49 The Washington Agreement, Dayton Peace Accord, the Interim Statue and the Rome Agreement are the most 
important ones all addressing how Mostar was to be reconstituted. 
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comprehensive Dayton Peace Accords (DPA).50 The city was to be demilitarised and 
EUAM was tasked with establishing a multi-ethnic, unified city administration.  
 
Initially, EUAM accepted three different entities: EUAM and the two established 
municipalities, the Bosnian-Croat and the Bosniac. Recognizing that reunifying 
Mostar was more than rebuilding the city – it was a political peacebuilding project –
efforts were made to overcome segregation and partition, though these proved to be 
futile. Holding local democratic elections for a single city council was part of this, as 
were efforts to negotiate to acceptance a single city statue.51 The EUAM envisaged 
that the city administration would be created once the elections were held and the 
legal statue was adopted. Yet, the negotiations to create a single unified city council 
led to protracted negotiations in 1995.  
 
The opposition against EUAM came initially from the Bosnian-Serbs/Serbs who 
continued to shell the city, including Hotel Ero the seat of EUAM, during the EUAM 
mandate. This seriously hampered EUAM’s efforts at reconstruction. Over time, the 
main opposition was found among the Bosnian-Croats and the Croat Democratic 
Union (HDZ). Riots and attacks against Hans Koschnik, the first EU administrator, 
by supporters of HDZ were an unsubtle attempt to intimidate the EU administrator 
and a response to a decree by Koschnik to increase the size of the shared central zone, 
beyond what the Bosnian-Croat leadership had agreed to (see below).52 The Bosnian-
Croat mayor of west Mostar rejected the plan and suspended his cooperation with 
EUAM. The violent resistance led to a summit meeting which included 
representatives from all the parties to the Dayton accords. As a result, an additional 
Croatian Muslim agreement was reached which led the EU to give in to some of the 
demands and reduce the size of the shared central zone more in line with the initial 
proposal agreed to by the Bosnian-Croats.53 This compromise arrangement led the 




Space-making in peacebuilding relates peace to space as peace remains abstract and 
ungrounded until spatialized through a process of materialization and 
contextualization. 55  In Mostar, space-making can be regarded as peacebuilding 
efforts to neutralize or counter the ethnification of urban space by the parties to the 
conflict and the spatialization of power-relations.  
 
The EU alone invested about 200 million euros to reconstruct Mostar with the intent 
to constructively undo the city’s wartime partition, ethnic cleavages and ethno-
national political power structures. 56  In a rather short period of time, EUAM 
reconstruction efforts transformed and reconfigured Mostar from a pre-war mixed 
municipality that encompassed all the urban area into a politically fragmented urban 
area containing six ethnically homogenous municipalities (three Croat and three 
Bosniac) confirming the wartime divisions, and one city administration with its 
                                                        
50 Bieber, op. cit. 
51 Yarwood, op. cit. 
52 M. Klemencic and C. Schofield, op. cit., p. 74. 
53 Yarwood, op. cit.  
54 M. Klemencic and C. Schofield, op. cit., p. 75. 
55 E. Soya, Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, pp. 9-10. 
56 S. Bollens, Cities, nationalism and democratization, op. cit., p. 189. 
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central zone jurisdiction comprising the historic town centre.57 The peacebuilding 
efforts to reintegrate the city came to concentrate on the “central zone,” and focussed 
on creating a shared, de-politicized public space.  
 
In early 1994, the only shared public space was hotel Ero, the seat of EUAM, situated 
on the confrontation line. All people, without exception were guaranteed access to the 
hotel. As such, hotel Ero became a beacon of hope to ordinary people.58 It was also at 
the hotel where the EU Administrator Mr. Koschnick helped to instigate talks 
between both sides, for example on a single unified city council and the boundaries of 
the central zone. A series of meetings were held to get both sides to agree to the 
boundaries of the central zone. The initial Bosnian-Croat proposal for the internal 
division of the city was essentially to respect the de facto line of separation and create 
three municipalities on each side. In contrast, the Bosniacs favoured a totally united 
city, which, because of the large number of displaced Bosniacs in East Mostar, would 
give their community an overall majority in the city.59 The Bosnian-Croats wanted a 
very small zone if any at all, as they did not want to surrender its war gains and the 
Bosniacs naturally wanted a very big zone.60 In the EUAM proposal, the central zone 
was to include all joint public facilities such as the post office, railway station, bus 
station, joint police headquarters, grammar school, public utility office, Hotel Ero 
and the four Federal Ministries required by the DPA to be placed in Mostar. 
Surprisingly, the Bosnian-Croats agreed to the proposal under pressure from Zagreb, 
but the Bosniacs rejected it. As the EU Administrator arbitrated, he issued a decree, 
which defined a much larger central zone incorporating a housing area penetrating 
far into Bosnian-Croat territory. Satisfying the Bosniac politicians, it outraged the 
Bosnian-Croat leader who immediately called for demonstrations against the EUAM 
at hotel Ero. 
 
At the time EUAM was set up the city was littered with street barricades, consisting of 
heavy lorries piled with sandbags, steel sheets and rubbish. The largest was a 
Bosnian-Croat barricade placed right outside Hotel Ero itself. Refusing to remove 
their barricade when asked, the EUAM asked UNPROFOR (United Nations 
Protection Force) to do so, and the Bosnian-Croats were forced to accept the fait 
accompli. Soon after, all the other material barriers came down.61 
 
Most local people saw the task of EUAM only in terms of reconstructing the war-
damaged city and repairing material objects, specifically bridges, buildings and 
infrastructure, while tasks such as education, culture, public finance and institutional 
development were undervalued.62 EUAM took pride in rebuilding five of the ten 
bridges across the Neretva River. Rebuilding the city meant restoring everyday life 
and this inspired gratitude among the inhabitants. This was an incentive for local 
political leaders to collaborate as they might gain advantages from cooperation and 
receive some of the gratitude and its inevitable political benefits. Hence, 
reconstruction projects became increasingly linked to the political aspects of 
peacebuilding and to the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. 
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58 Yarwood, op. cit., p. 13. 
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Bulletin, Summer 1996. 
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The governing principles that shaped the EUAM mission were derived from the EU 
framework of governance, which is shaped by key principles such as subsidiarity63 
and accountability as well as mechanisms of consultations. In the post-war 
reconstruction and peacebuilding of Mostar, these EU principles were intended to 
ensure local participation, partnership between EUAM and local stakeholders as well 
as to enhance the sense of local ownership in the reconstruction of the city.  
 
The MOU granted the EU administrator “the powers necessary to fulfil the aims and 
principles of the EU Administration…and to administer the Mostar city municipality 
properly and efficiently including regulatory powers and final decision-making 
authority in the executive field.” 64  Yet, the EU administrator’s powers were 
constrained in the sense that they were exercised within the framework of the 
Federation of BiH and by the terms of the MOU. EUAM was to comply with domestic 
laws and the decision-making authority was embedded in the institutional structure 
of the municipality. This meant, among other things, that EUAM was to exercise its 
authority in cooperation with the local council and operate in consultation and 
collaboration with local parties according to the principle of subsidiarity. In cases 
where domestic institutions were better placed and capable to make decisions, EUAM 
was to defer to local decision-making institutions. The EU administrator appointed 
an Advisory Council representing prominent local politicians to allow different 
communities to have a voice in the reconstruction and reunification processes. Two 
mayors of Mostar were the ‘Principal Counsellors.’ Meetings were held every month 
and it was believed that these meetings did contribute to reconcile the former warring 
parties. As the different departments of EUAM were set up, each departmental 
director would be supplied by a EU Member State and they were to have two co-
directors, nominated by the Bosnian-Croat and the Bosniac sides.65  
 
In the context of peacebuilding and reconstruction in Mostar, subsidiarity was 
married with urban planning in a novel way to produce shared public spaces that 
promote people’s safety and sense of belonging. The principle of subsidiarity, which 
is an organizing principle that dictates that matters ought to be handled at the lowest 
or least centralized level of competent authority, strengthened the urban planning 
idea of place-making. This bottom-up approach to urban reconstruction capitalizes 
on community assets, inspiration and potential. The overarching philosophy of the 
reconstruction department was that EUAM was to assist the Mostarians in rebuilding 
their city, not to try to expropriate that process. In terms of reconstruction, the 
principle of subsidiarity was put into practice and consultation with local 
communities and recruitment of local professionals became the standard operating 
procedures for the reconstruction department. Although working in an ad hoc 
manner, a unified Urban Planning Team was established that produced an All-
Mostar Structure Plan. There was a proposal from the head of the EUAM 
Reconstruction Department to integrate the Reconstruction Department into a local 
                                                        
63 Subsidiarity is perhaps the best known general principle of European Union Law. According to this principle, 
the EU may only act (i.e. make laws) where the actions of individual countries are insufficient. The principle was 
established in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, but at the local level it was already a key element of the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government, and instrument of the Council of Europé promulgated in 1985, which states 
that public responsibilities should be decentralized. 
64 Cited in C. Stahn, op. cit., pp. 303-304. 
65 Yarwood, op. cit., p. 12. 
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administration for urban planning and development until the end of the mandate to 
avoid it having a superior or independent existence. The proposal was rejected by the 
head of EUAM, as there was a preference for a more top-down approach based on 
finding high-level political agreements to everyday issues of urban planning. This of 
course further intensified the politicisation of the reconstruction processes.66  
 
Lessons learned from EUAM  
 
EUAM has a mixed record, but there are some important lessons to be learned both 
from the failures and the successes of the efforts at reconstruction and reintegration 
of Mostar.  
First, the EU’s reconstruction in Mostar was above all about space-making to undo 
the ethnification of urban space, to alter the territorial control of the communities 
and to counter the institutional and governance parallelism, which had created two 
cities in one. Yet, EUAM and the WEU police turned a blind eye to the continued 
expulsion of non-Bosnian-Croat citizens from West Mostar through terrorist attacks 
and violent ethnically motivated acts and through fear and hate including statements 
in the media.67 Consequently, Mostar was transformed by the war, and by the 
peacebuilding process from a pre-war mixed municipality to an ethno-nationally 
partitioned and segregated city. Mostar has remained divided despite a new city 
statue that imposed formal unification in the early 2004.68 This unfortunate outcome 
was mainly due to the inclusion of the terms of the initial MOU in the comprehensive 
Dayton Peace Accord, which, like many peace accords before it, relied on ethnic 
partition and decentralization to insure sustainability and stability, rather than 
integration and unification. This inevitably created tensions within the peacebuilding 
process aimed at reunification of Mostar, as the DPA contradicted the mandate of 
EUAM, which was to reintegrate the city. The negotiated interim city statute of 1996 
recognised and thereby institutionalised the ethnic cleavages in the city. Thus Mostar 
became a highly decentralized city with far-reaching power-sharing system, echoing 
the consociationalist approach to power-sharing at the national level, but with the 
players reversed, i.e. the Bosniac majority at the entity level is replaced by a Croat 
majority in Mostar. In Mostar, urbanism and urban governance became means by 
which war profiteers solidified their power and reinforced divisions. Therefore 
instead of promoting urbanism, citywide interests became subordinate to specific 
political objectives.69 Public services including electricity, water supply, education 
and urban planning that should have been integrated citywide became politicized, 
and ethnicized and two parallel systems emerged. None of the city council’s decisions 
to create common institutions and public companies were implemented. EUAM 
became increasingly reluctant to engage at the level of urban micro-scale and despite 
its early success there was a reticence to engage with urban planning. Hence, efforts 
to create a fairer and less territorial urban space largely failed. The EU’s foreign aid 
and investment practices also exacerbated the parallelism and fuelled the 
development of two separate economies and two separate infrastructures in Mostar 
as EU aid targeted individual ethnically controlled municipalities rather than the 
central “unified” administration. In a critical assessment it is claimed that, “EU aid 
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67 International Crisis Group, ‘Reunifying Mostar, Opportunities for progress,’ Balkan Report, No. 90, Sarajevo, 
Washington, Brussels, 2000. 
68 International Crisis Group, op. cit.; Bieber, op. cit. 
69 S. Bollens, ‘Urban Planning and Peacebuilding,’ Progress in Planning, No. 66, 2006, pp. 67-139. 
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reinforced ethnic apartheid.” 70  Despite EUAM’s success in reconstructing the 
wartime damage of the city’s infrastructure, Mostar effectively demonstrates the 
limited long-term impact of EUAM efforts to counter the development of ethno-
nationalist “parallelism” and “re-unite” the ethnically divided city.71 
 
Second, EUAM was concerned with peace-making and the negotiation of community 
identities and their spatial expressions, but was unable to manage the ‘spoilers of the 
peace process.’ The Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), for example, obstructed the 
more than thirty signed agreements (signed at the Federation and Canton level) and 
carried out a policy of maintaining a divided city and insisted on a Union of Croat 
Municipalities in Mostar. EUAM failed to see that the HDZ used negotiations as a 
tactic of political obstruction and protracted negotiations continued covering the 
same issues over and over again, while previous agreements were neither honoured 
nor implemented. As EUAM was largely unsuccessful in managing the spoilers and in 
combatting Croat defiance, Mostar became increasingly ungovernable. In a sense the 
EU did address symptoms of the ethno-nationally divided city in its removal of 
physical barriers along the dividing line, rebuilding the infrastructure and the 
building of symbolic bridges, and setting up a power-sharing structure of governance 
to prevent political domination by the ethnic majority political domination, but 
EUAM failed to address the underlying causes of the partition. In addition, EUAM’s 
insistence on treating both sides equally, despite the obvious obstructionism on the 
part of the Croats, caused the EUAM to lose credibility.  
 
Third, guided by the principle of subsidiarity EUAM was to reconstruct the city 
through a bottom up approach grounded in the local community and benefitting from 
local community assets, inspiration, and potential, to ultimately create shared urban 
spaces that promoted people’s well being and safety. In Mostar place-making 
provided communities with an influence on the reconstruction processes, and the 
EUAM Reconstruction Department was open to local initiatives. This is mainly where 
the achievements of the EUAM are found.  Through its unified reconstruction team 
and by working with local contractors selected through a tendering committee, 
EUAM was able to rebuild the infrastructure of the city, via the construction of 
schools, nurseries and basic public services, and re-establish freedom of movement 
within the city, which helped restore a sense of normal life in Mostar. However, it 
seems this bottom-up approach, combining urban planning and peacebuilding in an 
innovative way was not given full support at the top-level of EUAM.  
 
Conclusion: Implications for EUs peacebuilding praxis 
 
While post-war peacebuilding has been undertaken in cities72 as demonstrated by 
EUAM, peacebuilding strategies for cities where the city is recognized as a particular 
context and arena of such processes are rare. Administrating the divided city of 
Mostar was a visionary experiment by the EU. There were no precedents and no prior 
experience on which to draw. At the time, the EU was developing its approach to 
peacebuilding and conflict resolution and had very limited previous experience of 
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engaging in peacebuilding. As the EU has gained more experience in the field and its 
approach to peacebuilding has evolved the lessons from administrating Mostar can 
be seen in a new light.  
 
The division in Mostar persisted regardless of the Dayton Peace Accord, which was 
negotiated at the state level and successfully brought an end to the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This is an indication that the conventional focus of peacebuilding on the 
state-level may at times have counterproductive effects at sub-state levels. The DPA 
was not well suited for addressing the divisions of Mostar and in fact, the conflict in 
the city was frozen by the agreement. In some ways, the DPA also contradicted the 
mandate of EUAM as negotiated in the MOU. To overcome such obstacles to 
peacebuilding in divided cities, the EU approach needs to be able to rescale from 
state-centrism to the urban level in order to overcome frozen conflicts and cemented 
divides in contested cities and ultimately to produce a more localized, contextualized 
and thereby more legitimate peace. This of course challenges the conventional logic 
of peacebuilding as state building also to a large extent adhered to by the EU. Yet, by 
including the principle of subsidiarity in its peacebuilding approach, the EU would be 
better able to address ethnification of urban space and ensure local ownership. 
 
The peacebuilding efforts in Mostar highlight the complexity, diversity, contestation 
and contradictions involved in the reconstruction of symbolic urban spaces after 
violent conflict. The limited success of EUAM indicates an inability to understand 
these complexities and contestations and to acknowledge the divided city as a major 
obstacle to building sustainable peace. The fact that EUAM reconstruction efforts 
cemented division and segregation of Mostar is an obvious indication of the failure of 
peacebuilding to manage the post-conflict urban context. This implies that the EU 
peacebuilding approach and praxis need to be able to capture the specificities of the 
urban as an arena for peacebuilding and that urban governance is a key means to 
address issues of ethnic co-existence, tolerance and democracy in the everyday. By 
paying attention to the urban and its dynamics, EU peacebuilding could uncover the 
workings of power relations and how these relations are reproduced in the cityspace.  
 
As demonstrated by EUAM, peacebuilding strategies may fragment or integrate a city 
socially by either suppressing or dominating cultural identities or by reimagining 
identities in ways that nurture diversity within unity. Peacebuilding may reconstruct 
cities that either reinforce or seek to transcend community identities.73 However, only 
by realizing the city’s role as the spatial epicenter and battleground of violent conflict 
and accepting the city as a key arena of political participation can EU peacebuilding 
achieve its ambitions to overcome the visible and invisible divides in the city space. 
 
Peace-making in contested and ethno-nationally divided cities is characterised by 
negotiations between various conflicting aspirations of different ethno-national 
groups and their powerful drive to establish ethnic control over the urban space to 
construct facts on the ground and thereby reality.74 Negotiating the identity of urban 
communities in relation to the urban space is therefore an essential exercise for 
developing effective peacebuilding strategies to manage the conflicting aspirations 
and establishing legitimate governance structures at the urban level. By rescaling to 
the urban level it is possible to rethink the relationship between war, peace and 
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space. In adopting such an approach to peacebuilding that connects peace with space, 
the EU might be able to adjust peacebuilding to the cityspace. Such an approach 
should seek to connect the root causes of the conflict to the urban polarization in 
order to transform power asymmetries, attempt to decode space and to empower 
local peace constituencies and thereby contribute to reintegrating cities divided by 
violent conflict. 
 
